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1 Introduction
Public policy of most developed countries intervenes in the spatial distribution of
economic activity. First of all, this concerns large-scale programs that are designed
specifically for the purpose of directing resources towards well defined geographic
areas such as inter-regional transfers, place-based subsidies and local tax exemp-
tions. These interventions are usually motivated by the widespread concern that
economic development generates unequal living conditions across regions. While
there has been ample empirical studies about the effects of transfers in recipient
regions, the general equilibrium effects of these policies are not well understood
(Neumark and Simpson 2015). We make progress in this direction by evaluating the
general equilibrium effects of European regional transfers based on recent advances
in the quantitative analysis of economic-geography (see e.g. Allen and Arkolakis
2014 and Redding and Rossi-Hansberg 2017).
Place-based policies cover a range of measures: The most important ones in-
clude wage subsidies, investments in local transportation infrastructure, and trans-
fers aimed at strengthening local productivity.1 In our application of EU regional
policy these categories represent about 80% percent of total place-based policy ex-
penditure. The relevance and nature of spillovers – and thus the general equilibrium
effects – vary significantly across these three general types of place-based policy in-
struments. For instance, wage subsidies exert spillovers via market-size effects, local
transportation investments have immediate consequences for the entire transporta-
tion network, and local productivity gains dissipate to non-recipient regions via
the price indices of imported goods. Emphasizing the role of spillovers we identify
the optimal spatial distribution of these three different transfer types and explore
complementarities between transfer types as well as between transfers and local
endowments.
1We consider transfers that focus on local technological development as investments in produc-
tion amenities. This includes for instance investments in local energy supply, schools or broadband
telecommunication. A list of project examples financed by the EU’s regional policy which we ana-
lyze in our application is documented at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/projects.
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Our application focuses on one of the largest regional policy schemes: the Eu-
ropean Structural & Cohesion Funds. Already since 1975 these policies are central
to the process of European integration and since then the budget has grown con-
tinuously. During the budgeting period 2007 to 2013, the Structural & Cohesion
Funds invested about 347.4 billion Euros in recipient regions. This accounts for
approximately one third of the EU’s total budget and represents 0.17% of the EU
member states’ total GDP (see Commission 2008). According to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, the aim of the EU’s regional policy is to reduce
“[...] disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the
backwardness of the least favoured regions” (see Article 174, European Commission
2012) and to ensure economic progress in the member states of the EU. Hence,
there is a twofold aim of reducing income inequality across regions and improving
aggregate economic development. Our analysis shows that an optimal allocation of
wage subsidies and investments in local production amenities could both increase
efficiency and reduce disparities compared to the existing allocation. In contrast,
the welfare-optimal design of transportation investments conflicts with the aim of re-
ducing income inequality. Considering all transfer types, our analysis suggests that
switching to the optimal allocation could achieve efficiency gains of about 8.36%
compared to the existing scheme.
The EU recognizes the importance of spillovers and expects that “all Member
States benefit from positive spillovers generated by investments in cohesion coun-
tries” (see Commission 2017). We show that partial equilibrium effects focusing on
the local effects in recipient regions significantly overestimate the impact of wage
subsidies and investments in production amenities. However, positive spillovers
dominate for investments in transportation infrastructure.
We incorporate the main types of regional transfers into a quantitative model
which captures costly inter-regional trade, factor mobility and endogenous agglomer-
ation economies in the spirit of the new economic geography.2 We fit the multi-region
2See e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003) for an overview on the new economic geography.
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model to detailed data for European NUTS2 regions and thereby recover location
fundamentals reflecting regional consumption and production amenities as well as
migration costs.3 Our model performs well in matching empirically observed pat-
tern across European regions. This allows to use the model structure to study the
effects of different types of regional transfers on the geography of economic activity
and most importantly to account for the direct cost of transfers and their spillover
effects on other regions. In particular, we analyze the effects of place-based policies
on aggregate efficiency and regional inequality, as measured by the Gini indices of
income and population density.
We use a quasi-experimental design and detailed information about the regional
distribution of EU transfers for the time period 1994-2013 jointly with data about
travel times and market access to estimate the key parameters of the model. Using
the estimated parameters, we solve a global optimization problem and derive the
welfare optimal design of regional policy regarding the spatial distribution of trans-
fers and across different transfer types. We compare this optimal distribution to the
observed distribution as well as other counterfactual scenarios. More specifically, we
show how the spatial equilibrium would change if transfers were discontinued and
distributed equally according to the regional population shares.
We find that the EU place-based policy led to a positive welfare effect of 3.23%
compared to a scenario without transfers. This is mainly driven by a change in the
average levels of productivity and transportation costs because the existing policy
does not realize the potential of distributing the investments in a welfare optimiz-
ing way. In particular, this becomes evident when comparing the current scheme
to a naive rule that pays a uniform per-capita transfer to all regions. Overall, this
naive rule dominates and would achieve additional efficiency gains of 0.11 percentage
points but would be less effective in reducing regional inequality. Considering indi-
vidual transfer types, the only instance where the current scheme is more efficient
3Eurostat, the statistical agency of the European Union, operates a regional classification
scheme (Nomenclature des Unite´s Territoriales Statistiques) where NUTS2 corresponds to re-
gional entities of 0.8m to 3m inhabitants. The current EU consists of 273 NUTS2 regions.
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than the naive rule are wages subsidies. This is due to a higher marginal utility of
transfers in low income regions which have been the main recipients.
The welfare optimal spatial distribution looks very different for the three trans-
fer types: While wage subsidies should be focused on very few poor and peripheral
regions, the distribution of investments in production amenities should be much
less concentrated and cover regions in the core as well as in the periphery. Invest-
ments in transportation infrastructure are most efficient when focused on regions
in the core of Europe. What determines how much transfers of a given type a re-
gion should receive in the welfare optimal scheme? Regarding characteristics that
cannot be influenced by transfers, we show that migration costs enter negatively
while a higher location attractiveness and higher supply of residential land raise
the marginal welfare gain of each transfer type. Efficient investments in production
amenities leverage positive spillovers on other regions such that other things equal
these investments should be directed to regions with high market access. Following
the same logic, investments in transportation infrastructure are most valuable when
connecting highly productive places. Accordingly investments in local production
amenities and local transportation infrastructure are shown to be complements. In
contrast, the marginal welfare gain of wage subsidies increases in the average trade
costs a region faces and decreases in its productivity. The most sizable benefit from
reallocating to the optimal scheme can be realized for wage subsidies: There, the
existing benefit can be tripled without an increase in regional disparities.
Below, we discuss our approach with reference to the related literature. We in-
troduce the model in Section 3 and describe the estimation of the model parameters
in Section 4. A number of counterfactual policy changes are analyzed in Section 5
and the complementarities between transfer types are explored in Section 6. Section
7 documents the importance of general equilibrium effects versus partial equilib-
rium effects and the last section summarizes and draws conclusions about potential
reforms of regional transfers in Europe.
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2 Literature
Our paper relates to a sizable strand of literature evaluating the effects of place-based
policies (see e.g. Glaeser and Gottlieb 2008, Kline and Moretti 2014, Neumark and
Simpson 2015). Boldrin and Canova (2001) initiated a number of studies focusing
on place-based policies in the EU. Becker et al. (2010) address the endogeneity of
transfer recipience by exploiting a discontinuity in the mechanism that determined
eligibility for so-called Objective 1 transfers (the main instrument of EU regional
policy) and show that the policy induced local growth and income effects beyond
a simple consumption stimulus.4 In order to estimate the parameters underlying
the link between local characteristics and transfers we follow the quasi-experimental
identification strategy by Becker et al. (2010) but apply it to outcomes that have
not been studied before, i.e. measure the impact of regional transfers on local
productivity amenities and transportation costs.
Most evaluations of place-based policies follow reduced-form analyses and iden-
tify the local effects in recipient regions. Hence, they mostly ignore spillovers on
other regions and thus quantify only partial equilibrium effects. However, the ag-
gregate efficiency of spatially targeted transfers depends critically on migration re-
sponses and adjustments in land rents and local prices in general (e.g. Busso et al.
2013). Migration responses and job displacement effects of place-based transfer can
be substantial as documented by Einio¨ and Overman (2016) and Ehrlich and Seidel
(2016) for regional transfers in the UK and Germany. Complex spatial interactions
occur not only via relocation of households and firms but also via interregional trade
and investments. For instance, an increase in local income will raise demand not only
for locally produced goods but also in those regions that sustain close trade links
with the transfer recipient region. Similarly, changes in productivity and transport
costs will induce a reshuffling of bilateral trade shares. Accordingly, for a compre-
hensive evaluation of the effectiveness of place-based policies migration and trade
4Further reduced-form evaluations of European regional policy include Midelfart-Knarvik and
Overman (2002), Mohl and Hagen (2010), Pellegrini et al. (2013).
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channels are relevant. Reduced-form analyses are usually not capable of identify-
ing these interdependences. In particular as these spillovers are not constraint to
neighboring regions, a structural framework is required to derive the net effect or
place-based policies.5
In order to identify the general equilibrium effects of place-based policies we
build upon recent work in quantitative economic-geography (e.g. Allen and Arko-
lakis 2014, Caliendo et al. 2016, Redding 2016, Desmet et al. 2016) and link it
to data about regional transfers. The combination of model structure and quasi-
experimental variation in transfer recipience allows us to identify key parameters of
the model and to compute counterfactual scenarios. Hence, a key contribution of
the paper is to compare the spatial equilibria that materialize under different policy
schemes and to conduct welfare analyses. From a welfare perspective, a lasting im-
pact on the spatial equilibrium is likely to dominate a policy measure’s local effect
on income or employment as typically identified in reduced-form analyses. More-
over, assuming that the identified parameters of the model remain constant, we can
compute the effects of large-scale policy changes. The non-linearities prevalent in
economic geography (both in theory and data) make it particularly relevant to go
beyond marginal changes as typically obtained in empirical evaluations. Finally,
we use the structural model to implement a constrained optimization approach fol-
lowing Su and Judd (2012) and characterize the welfare optimal design of regional
transfers.
Our paper closely relates to recent contributions in the quantitative analysis of
the spatial effects of public policies: Fajgelbaum et al. (2016) evaluate the degree
of spatial misallocation due to taxes, Ossa (2017) analyzes welfare costs of subsidy
competition in the US, and Gaubert (2017) study the effects of place-based poli-
cies on the location choice of heterogeneous firms. We deviate from these papers
in a number of ways: First, we compare different channels of place-based policies
5Some reduced form analyses reduce the issue of spillovers (i.e. the violation of the stable unit
treatment value assumption in the identification of the treatment effect) by excluding observations
in the spatial proximity of treated regions from the control group (e.g. Kolko and Neumark 2010).
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i.e. wage subsidies, investments in production amenities and in transport infras-
tructure. Second, we derive the welfare optimal distribution of different types of
place-based transfers. Third, we derive the factors that determine the optimal place
of investment for each type and show complementarities between different transfer
types.6
Furthermore, we relate to the literature analyzing investments in transporta-
tion infrastructure. Recent papers by Alder (2016), Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017)
search for the optimal transport infrastructure network in trade models and find
that investments in the core are overall beneficial. Baum-Snow et al. (2017) analyze
transportation infrastructure investments in China and show that improvements in
transport infrastructure can induce a loss of economic activity in the periphery.
Allen and Arkolakis (2016) develop an analytical solution for how infrastructure
investments between neighboring regions impact trade costs between all other re-
gion dyads. We employ this framework and highlight the interrelations between
investments in local transportation infrastructure and other transfers such as wage
subsidies and investments in local production amenities. Moreover, we analyze to
what extent the transfer types are capable of reducing spatial inequalities and raising
aggregate welfare.
3 Model
Our analysis builds on the framework introduced by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg
(2017) featuring multiple regions, endogenous agglomeration economies, and a land
market mitigating the concentration of economic activity. The economy is endowed
with L¯ =
∑
n Ln workers in total and each worker Ln inelastically supplies one unit
of labor. Every region n ∈ N is endowed with an exogenous quality-adjusted supply
of land Hn. In equilibrium mobility of workers equalizes indirect utility up to the
6Another related strand of literature is Albouy (2012) and Henkel et al. (2017) which consider
the effects of fiscal equalization in the US and in Germany.
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prevailing migration costs across regions. Trade between regions i and n is inhibited
by iceberg transport cost dni ≥ 1, where the first subscript refers to the place
of consumption. The model allows for unbalanced trade due to regional transfers
and regional imbalances in asset holdings. A central government can influence the
distribution economic activity by paying regions wage subsidies or by investing in
local productivity amenities and local transportation infrastructure. In equilibrium
these three types of transfers are shown to exert quantitatively important spillovers
on neighboring regions via trade, migration and imbalances in asset holdings. The
directions of spillovers depends on the transfer type. In the following we lay out the
model details and discuss how regional transfers and federal taxes are integrated.
3.1 Preferences and demand
Utility of an agent ω residing in n has Cobb-Douglas form
Un(ω) = bn(ω)
(
Cn
α
)α(
Hn
1− α
)1−α
, (1)
where α ∈ [0, 1], Cn represents a composite good, Hn is residential land use and bn is
a location-specific preference shifter which is drawn for each worker independently.
The idiosyncratic amenity term bn captures the idea that workers have heterogeneous
preferences for living in each location. We assume that location preferences are
drawn i.i.d. across locations and workers from a Fre´chet distribution with cumulative
distribution function
Gn(b) = e
−Bnb− , (2)
where the scale parameter Bn determines average amenities for location n and the
shape parameter  controls the dispersion of the value of amenities across workers
for each location. The composite consumption good consists of a set F =
∑
n∈N Fn
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varieties j that are aggregated according to
Cn =
(∑
i∈N
∫ Fi
0
cni(j)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
, (3)
where σ = 1
1−ρ refers to the elasticity of substitution. With monopolistic competition
and fixed cost of production the number of varieties equals the number of firms.
Maximizing (3) subject to the budget constraint delivers total demand for a variety
of the differentiated good cni(j) =
pni(j)
−σ
P 1−σn
αynLn where yn denotes region n’s per-
capita income, Ln is location n’s labor force, Pn =
[ ∑
i∈N
∫ Fi
0
p1−σni (j)dj
] 1
1−σ
refers
to the price index and pni = pidni is the consumer price for a variety produced in i
and consumed in region n.
Individuals are mobile across regions but face migration costs Mrn when migrat-
ing from r to n. These costs are measured in terms of utility such the net utility
after relocation is given by Un(ω)/Mrn. To quantify the model at a fine regional scale
(264 NUTS2 regions) we follow Desmet et al. (2016) and split migration cost into
origin and destination specific components Mrn = ormn.
7 Since individuals staying
at the same place do not face these costs, Mnn = 1, we obtain mn =
1
on
. We assume
mn ≥ 1 such that an individual migrating from location r to n gets a utility benefit
or for leaving location r and pays a cost mn =
1
on
for entering location n.8 In the
following we express everything in terms of entry costs mn.
3.2 Trade Costs
Infrastructure investments represent one of the main instruments of European re-
gional policy. Evidently these investments reduce transportation costs between two
regions that are connected by a newly established or improved transportation link,
7Data on bilateral migration is not available on the regional level in Europe.
8Note that mn may in principle also be smaller than 1 such that individuals are paid for entering
region n and have to pay a fee or = 1/mr for leaving region r.
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say regions r and i. Moreover, these investments are expected to impact trade costs
for any other region pair for which the new link is located on the least-cost path.
While these groups of beneficiaries can in principle be identified, the least-cost path
itself is likely to be endogenous as well which complicates the analysis.9 Therefore
we employ a framework recently developed by Allen and Arkolakis (2016) which
assigns for a good shipped from r to n a certain probability that it passes any other
region. The idea is that shipments are carried out by a continuum of traders with
idiosyncratic costs of choosing different routes. Accordingly, there is a non-zero
probability that shipments between two non-adjacent regions pass any transporta-
tion link. We refer to a transportation link as the direct connection between two
adjacent regions r, i which incurs direct iceberg trade costs d˜ni. For elements repre-
senting non-adjacent region pairs n and i it is assumed that d˜ni =∞. In particular,
we specify direct trade costs as a function of road travel time TravelT imeri between
adjacent regions:
d˜ri = e
β·TravelT imeri , (4)
where β is estimated for European NUTS2 regions. The aggregate trade cost for
shipping a good across non-adjacent locations r, n are given by the product of direct
trade costs along the chosen path. We assume that path-specific trade-costs shocks
occur and that traders choose the path by minimizing trade costs. In this setting
Allen and Arkolakis (2016) derive the expected trade costs from n to i as:
dni = Γ
(
θ − 1
θ
)[
I− D˜
] 1
θ
ni
, (5)
where θ denotes the shape parameter of the Fre´chet distributed trade-cost shocks,
Γ denotes the gamma distribution, I is an identity matrix, and the direct iceberg
trade costs enter in adjacency matrix D˜ = [d˜−θri ] . Due to path-specific shocks, which
can also be interpreted as idiosyncratic tastes, trade between two regions can follow
any route including the most indirect ones with a certain probability. However, the
9This relates to recent papers by Alder (2016) and Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017) which identify
optimal transport networks.
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probability of passing a certain link decreases with the costs of the detour that arises
from the deviation from the least-cost route that would be applicable without shocks.
Accordingly, a transport investment at link ri is more relevant for trade between
region pairs having their least-cost route in the proximity of ri and accordingly
pass the link more frequently than for those region pairs with their least-cost route
being distant from link ri.10 In the following we estimate the effect of transport
investments on travel time between adjacent regions, which impacts direct trade
costs d˜ni according to (4) and affects expected trade costs between all other regions
according to (5).
In summary, using a value for θ > 0 as obtained by Allen and Arkolakis (2016)
and estimating β based on European NUTS2 data we can reproduce the effect of a
local transport-time reduction at any link ri for the aggregate European transport
network. Such a modification of the transport network triggered by a local invest-
ment may result in a new spatial equilibrium with substantial relocation of economic
activity far beyond the one explained by the direct effect on link ri.
An alternative approach would be to specify trade costs from a gravity model
as in Anderson and Yotov (2010) or Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) using a
pseudo-maximum-likelihood (Poisson-PML) estimator. Comparing this traditional
approach with our definition of trade costs yields very similar levels of trade costs
as illustrated in Appendix A.1.2. Accordingly, our analysis of wage subsidies and
federal investments in production amenities is independent of whether we employ a
specification with endogenous least-cost path or a traditional approach. However,
the former approach allows us to study the effects of federal transport investments
and their interactions with the other transfers in a more comprehensive way. In
particular it accounts for transport investments altering the centrality of a region
i.e. changes the number of regions dyads for which trade passes along the link.
10More details about the specification of trade costs in presented in Appendix A.1.
12
3.3 Regional Income
Regional per-capita income yn stems from after tax wages wn(1 − τn), per-capita
subsidies Tn, rent income (1 − ιn)Hnrn/Ln and per-capita payments from a global
portfolio χ. We denote the tax rate by τn and the rent per unit of land by rn. As
in Caliendo et al. (2016) and Monte et al. (2016) we assume that land is owned by
locals and non-locals. Hence, individuals contribute a share ιn ∈ [0, 1] of land rents
to a global portfolio which redistributes rents to workers throughout the economy
and yields a per-capita payment χ. Thereby we allow for trade deficits across regions
which is empirically relevant and particularly important in the context of place-based
policy. For instance, regional transfers are likely to capitalize in local asset values
which benefit not only local residents but any asset holders in the recipient regions.
The sum of all returns from the global portfolio is redistributed equally to the regions
according to their relative population size χLn. Note that even with balanced asset
holdings trade imbalances apply in our model due to regional transfers. However,
without taking into account imbalances in asset holdings we may overestimate the
effect of transfers on trade imbalances. Aggregate regional income amounts to
ynLn = wnLn − τnwnLn + Lnµ(Tn) + (1− ιn)Hnrn + χLn, (6)
where µ(.) is a flexible function that links benefits of public per-capita wage transfers
Tn to income relevant returns. This accounts for efficiency costs of public budget on
the spending side, which turns out to be qualitatively equivalent to introducing a
distortion of labor supply. The functional form of µ(.) and details of excess burden
of taxation is specified in Section 3.5. Per-capita rents accruing from the global
portfolio can be expressed as χ = (1/L¯)
∑
n∈N ιnHnrn. The difference between the
contribution to the portfolio and the revenue out of it generates imbalances in trade
accounts. Regions displaying a higher value of ιn than the average are characterized
by a trade surplus and vice versa regions with a below average value of ιn. Trade
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balance may be stated as
Υn ≡ ιnHnrn + τnwnLn − χLn − Lnµ(Tn). (7)
Note, that agents do not internalize the effect of their migration decisions on the
local rents distributed to other agents such that χ remains constant. Due to Cobb-
Douglas utility we can express the rental rate for land as rn = [(1− α)ynLn] /Hn
and reformulate per-capita income as
yn =
1
α + ιn − αιn [wn(1− τn) + µ(Tn) + χ] (8)
3.4 Production
The production side is characterized by a technology that incurs fixed costs and
region specific variable costs of labor to produce a variety. Thus, producing xn(j)
units requires ln(j) = φ+
xn(j)
an
units of labor where an captures regional productivity.
Profit maximizing prices pni(j) =
σ
σ−1
dniwi
ai
and free-entry imply that equilibrium
output is identical across all firms in a region and given by xn(j) = φ(σ − 1)an.
Since prices and output are identical across firms within region we may drop the
variety identifier in the following. From the equilibrium output it is evident that the
total number of firms in each region is proportional to the number of local workers:
Fn =
Ln
σφ
. Accordingly, the value of trade flows from region i to n can be stated as
Xni = αynLnFi
p1−σni
P 1−σn
. (9)
Substituting the number of firms and profit-maximizing prices in the demand func-
tions we obtain the the fraction of region n’s expenditure on goods produced in
region i
pini =
Li
(
dniwi
ai
)1−σ
∑
k∈N Lk
(
dnkwk
ak
)1−σ , (10)
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as well as the price index in region n
Pn =
σ
(σ − 1)
(
Ln
σφpinn
)1/(1−σ)
dnnwn
an
. (11)
A key implication of introducing agglomeration forces in the tradition of the new
economic geography is that the local number of varieties produced is proportional
to the local population. Moreover, the elasticity of substitution governs not only
the utility attached to changes in the terms of trade but also the strengths of the
agglomeration forces. Other studies such Allen and Arkolakis (2014) or Desmet
et al. (2016) model agglomeration forces in a more agnostic way and introduce a
further parameter that links population density to local productivity.
3.5 Regional and Federal Government
The national governments levies labor income taxes (τn) which are transferred to
the federal budget and used to finance aggregate transfers Tn. Reflecting the most
important components of European regional policy, we consider effects on local
wages, local technology – which increase a region’s fundamental productivity – and
investments in local infrastructure – which reduce travel-time across direct links. We
denote all transfers in per-capita terms. Thus, the government budget constraint is
given by: ∑
n∈N
wnLnτn =
∑
n∈N
LnTn. (12)
Taxes in our model are locally distortive in the sense that higher labor taxes
make a location less attractive for labor supply, but the tax has no effect on global
labor supply. In addition we introduce an efficiency cost κy ∈ [0, 1] of taxation
and assume that a marginal increase in per-capita transfers yields an income gain
of only 0 < κy < 1 while the rest melts away due to potential inefficiencies in the
public sector.11 Accordingly, we specify the income relevant wage subsidy in the
11This functional form has the property of a constant marginal excess burden as a marginal
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benchmark model as
µ(Tn) = κ
y · Tn. (13)
Note that a higher level of tax revenues can be raised for a given tax rate in regions
where nominal wages are high. The elasticity of local labor supply with regard to
the taxes and transfer is highest at places with high out-migration benefits which
implies low in-migration costs
We further specify that travel time TravelT imeri(Ti, Tr, Li, Lr) can be reduced
by public investments in roads and railway between regions n and i according to the
following function:
TravelT imeri = γ
d
ri − κd ·
ln (TrLr + TiLi)
(Lr + Li)ξ
. (14)
Per-capita investments in transportation infrastructure, thus, reduces all the
travel time across all direct links which feeds back on expected trade costs across
adjacent and non-adjacent regions according to Section 3.2. Similarly as in Fajgel-
baum et al. (2016) we argue that investments in public transportation are rival to
some extent as congestion costs increase in the local number of inhabitants and
accordingly a higher investment is needed for a given travel time reduction.12 The
parameter ξ governs the degree of rivalry of public investments. As ξ → 0 public
investment becomes fully non-rival. A link specific level of travel time γdri which
is applicable in a counterfactual situation without transfers is identified empirically
below.
The third effect of federal investment concerns R&D activities, universities,
broadband internet access, energy supply etc. which we assume to impact local
productivity. Hence, we introduce public investment in local production amenities
unit of tax revenue only allows for a constant usage of κy < 1 units of per-capita wage relevant
transfers. The efficiency costs are thus constant as the level of regional transfers increases.
12Related to our specification Fajgelbaum et al. (2016) accounts for varying degree of rivalry
of public goods and Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017) integrate congestion costs in transportation
networks. Edwards (1990) compares different functional forms embodying congestion of public
goods.
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rendering regional technology endogenous:
an = γ
a
n + κ
a · ln (TnLn)
Lξn
. (15)
Again a region specific level of productivity for counterfactual situation without
transfers γan is empirically obtained using detailed data about federal transfers. In
Section 4 we describe the estimation of region- and link-specific fixed effects as well
as the identification of elasticities κa and κd.
3.6 Residential Choice
Using the above expressions for rental rate, and price index (11) we obtain real
income,
yn
Pαn r
1−α
n
= γ
(
anyn
dnnwn
)α(
pinn
Ln
)α/(1−σ)(
Hn
Ln
)1−α
, (16)
where γ = (σ−1
σ
)α(σφ)
α
1−σ 1
1−α
(1−α)
.
Indirect utility of an individual migrating from n to i depends on migration costs,
real income, and a stochastic amenity term at the place of destination Vni(ω) =
bi(ω)
Mni
yi
Pαi r
1−α
i
. Since amenities follow a Fre´chet distribution and indirect utility is a
transformation of the random amenity draw, the cumulative distribution function
of indirect utility follows again a Fre´chet distribution and is given by Gni(V ) =
e
− Bi
M
ni
(
yi
Pα
i
r1−α
i
)
V −
. The probability that an individual prefers locations i over all
other locations corresponds to the share of region n’s population that relocates
to region i. Using the above distributions, the share of people in location n and
migrating to i corresponds to
Lni
Ln
= Pr(Vni ≥ max{Vnk},∀ k ∈ N) =
Bi
Mni
(
yi
Pαi r
1−α
i
)
∑
k∈N
Bk
Mnk
(
yk
Pαk r
1−α
k
) . (17)
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Note that with the specification of migration costs as outlined above the conditional
migration flow is independent of the place of origin. Using
∑
n∈N Lni = Li, substi-
tuting origin and destination specific components of migration costs and taking the
sum over all places n on both sides of (17) we derive regional population shares
λn =
Bn
mn
(
yn
Pαn r
1−α
n
)
∑
k∈N
Bk
mk
(
yk
Pαk r
1−α
k
) , (18)
where λn =
Ln∑
k∈N Lk
. A high value of  implies that the location specific amenity
draws are less dispersed. As a result, locations become better substitutes and an
increase in the relative appeal of a location (i.e. increase in real wage) leads to a
larger response in the fraction of workers who choose to locate there. In an extreme
case of no location taste heterogeneity (→∞) workers are not attached to a specific
location and there is a perfectly elastic supply of labor.
From the cumulative distribution Gni(V ) it follows that expected indirect utility
of an individual originating from n and living in i is given by
E[Vni] = E[Vn] = δ
[∑
k∈N
Bk
M nk
(
yk
Pαk r
1−α
k
)] 1
, (19)
where δ = Γ( −1

) is a constant term and Γ() refers to the Gamma function. Popu-
lation mobility implies that the expected indirect utility of a person – adjusted for
migration costs – has to be identical across all potential destinations such that in
equilibrium locations are chosen optimally. Further substituting population share
(18) and imposing symmetry of the costs of entry and exit in aggregate migration
costs we obtain:
E[Vni] = δ (Bi)
1

(
yi
Pαi r
1−α
i
)(
1
λi
) 1
 1
Mni
, (20)
As certain locations provide more utility than others, workers move to the place
which provides the highest possible utility net of migration costs. Hence, an increase
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in nominal wages is ceteris paribus accompanied by an increase in local population
share. Moreover, due to agglomeration benefits larger markets pay higher wages
and are characterized by a bigger variety of local goods which reflects in a lower
price index for the composite good. However, an inflow of population bids up land
prices, which acts as a dispersion force in the model and reduces real wages. To
ensure an unique equilibrium dispersion forces must dominate agglomeration forces
in equilibrium. This leads to the following parameter restriction σ
(
1− α
1+1/
)
> 1
and rules out that the whole population is located in one region.13
3.7 General equilibrium
Given the set of parameters {σ, α, } the general equilibrium can be expressed by the
market clearing conditions on goods and labor markets and the migration equilib-
rium condition. Market clearing on the goods market requires that location i’s labor
income is equal to the total expenditure for the goods produced in that location:
wnλn = α
∑
k∈N
piknλkyk. (21)
Labor market clearing follows from (10) and the location choice probabilities (17)
jointly with real income in (16) close the model. With 264 NUTS2 regions this
yields a total of 70,224 equilibrium conditions.14 Based on these conditions and
data for {λn, wn, yn, Hn, dni} we can recover the location fundamentals of the model
{an, pini, Bn/mn}. All other endogenous variables can be expressed in terms of the lo-
cation fundamentals and the exogenous variables. Details about inverting the model
to perform overidentification checks for the location fundamentals are presented in
the next section. For our counterfactual analyses we do not need the level values of
location attractiveness adjusted for migration costs (Bn/mn) as we apply the exact
13 For a detailed discussion see Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) and our equation (24).
14Our system of equation has 264×264 bilateral trade shares according to (10) and 264 location
choice probabilities (equation (17)) as well as 264 goods market clearing conditions (equation (21))
which are sum up to 70’224 equations.
19
hat algebra introduced by Dekle et al. (2007) to derive welfare changes.
4 Estimation & calibration
In this section we discuss how we set the parameters, describe the data source of
exogenous variables entering the model, outline the estimation approach for {dni, ιn}
and explain how we obtain the elasticities of location amenities and trade costs with
regard to transfers. As it is evident from the maps in Figure 1, our data covers
almost all NUTS2 regions in the EU27 countries.15 The EU administers its place-
based policies according to multi-annual budgeting periods. We fit the model to
data for the three most recent budgeting periods 1994-1999, 2000-2006 and 2007-
2013 in order to explore the validity of our model and to obtain time variation in
the location fundamentals. For the analysis of counterfactuals we focus on the most
recent budgeting period 2007-2013 and perform sensitivity checks for the earlier
periods. In total we observe data for 264 European NUTS2 regions which were
eligible for EU transfers in the most recent period. Summary statistics of all our
exogenous variables are reported in Table A.2, and Figure 1 illustrates the spatial
distribution of these variables.
Regional transfers: The EU Commission (Directorate-General for Regional and
Urban Policy) provides detailed information on regional transfers for all three bud-
geting periods at the NUTS2 level. The data covers regional expenditures from
all three sources of regional transfers, the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) as well as for the Cohesion Fund (CF).
The transfers are classified according to 12 spending categories which we assign to
the respective transfer types.16 We recognize that all types of transfer categories are
15Due to missing data our analysis excludes the remote islands Madeira, Ac¸ores, Canary Islands
and the French overseas territories.
16These categories are: Business support, Energy, Environment and natural resources, Human
resources, IT infrastructure and services, Research and Technology, Social infrastructure, Technical
assistance, Tourism & Culture, Transport infrastructure, Urban and rural regeneration.
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potentially relevant for income in the recipient regions and and sometimes it is not
obvious whether a certain EU investment affected primarily local productivity or
transportation costs. Accordingly, in the benchmark analysis, we sum all per-capita
transfers across all categories to obtain Tn and empirically identify the effects on the
productivity and transportation costs channels. We perform robustness checks to
show that our results are robust to assuming that only certain categories of transfers
are relevant for the respective channels.
The existing distribution of EU regional transfers is far from uniform and place-
based subsidies are strongly tied to regional economic development as well as political
bargaining (see e.g. Charron 2016). The highest transfer intensities were observed
in the Southern and Eastern periphery of the EU as shown in panel a) of Figure
1. Notably, virtually all regions received a positive transfer from the central EU
government. Yet, there is a substantial variation as per-capita transfers ranged
between 34 Cents and 892 Euros.
Population shares and regional income: Cambridge Econometrics’ European
Regional Database (ERD) provides information on population, employment and per-
capita income for every NUTS2 region and the whole time period 1994-2013. Since
the model assumes full employment, our benchmark simulations use employment
data for Ln as well as for the shares (λn). Note that all results are robust to using
population data instead. Per-capita income (yn) is measured at 2005 constant price
euros using a sectoral price deflator. The spatial distribution of per-capita income
and population shares is depicted in panels b) and c) of Figure 1.
Residential land supply: Information about residential land-use stems from
the dataset “Ecosystem types of Europe” published by the European Environment
Agency (EEA). This data provides habitat information for every 100x100m cell ac-
cording to the European nature information system (EUNIS) habitat classification.
For residential land-use (Hn) we sum up all constructed, industrial and other artifi-
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cial habitats for every NUTS2 region.17 Regional levels of Hn are shown in panel d)
of Figure 1.
Price of land and shares to global portfolio: We compute the price of the
immobile factor – land – using the condition rn = (1−α)Lnyn/Hn jointly with data on
regional per-capita income (yn), population (Ln) and residential supply of land (Hn)
as described above. For the consumer’s expenditure share in goods consumption
we follow Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011) and assume α = 0.75. Note that this
corresponds very well with Eurostat data about household expenditure allocated to
housing.18
The trade balance is calculated by calibrating each region’s share of the immobile
sector paid into the international portfolio ιn. We solve for ιn by minimizing the
sum of squared errors between the observed trade balance ΥDatan and the model’s
trade balance as defined in (7):
min
ιn
(ΥDatan + Lnµ(Tn)− τnwnLn − ιnHnrn + χLn)2. (22)
Note that per-capita rents from the international portfolio are defined as χ =∑
i∈N ιiHiri∑
n∈N Ln
. Data for annual trade balance ΥDatan stems from Eurostat and is only
available at country level. To obtain region n’s trade balance we weight the coun-
try’s trade balance GDP. Thus, we divide the trade balance by GDP data from
Eurostat and take averages over the respective budgeting periods. To correct trade
balance for imbalances in the EU fiscal and place-based policy we use information
about financial contribution to the EU budget (τnwnLn) and revenues from the EU
budget (Lnµ(Tn)). Figure A.2 in Appendix A depicts the high correlation of 0.994
between the data and the model’s trade balance.
17This corresponds to the EUNIS habitat classification J which captures: Buildings of cities,
towns and villages, low density buildings, extractive industrial sites, transport networks and other
constructed hard-surfaced areas, highly artificial man-made waters and associated structures and
waste deposits.
18According to Eurostat (2016) households in the EU spent nearly 25% of their income on
housing.
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Figure 1: Overview of exogenous variables
(a) Transfers per capita (Tn) (b) Population share (λn)
(c) Regional income (yn) (d) Residential land supply (Hn)
Note: The figures depict quantiles of the reported variables. A darker shading in the map indicates a higher value. Data on
transfers bases on the budgeting period 2007-13. Per-capita income and population shares are measured as averages over the years
2007- 13. Residential land supply refers to the year 2012.
23
Wages: We obtain region n’s wages wn from equation (8) where we specify the in-
come relevant wage subsidy according to (13) and set the efficiency of wage subsidies
(κy) in the benchmark analysis equal to 0.975 as suggested by Harberger (1964).19
Note that welfare effects of adjusting the distributions of transfer are qualitatively
not affected by the choice of the excess burden parameter.
In our main analysis we set tax rates (τn) constant across regions and thus tax
revenue proportional to regional wages. This seems legitimate as the two main
sources of the EU budget are proportional to local income. By far the most im-
portant part of a country’s contribution to the EU budget bases on a uniform rate
applied to the gross national income (GNI) of each member state. In 2012 the
EU-27 countries contributed 86.8% to the EU budget according to their GNI based
valuation. The second most important component refers to contributions according
to a harmonised VAT of 0.3%. The value added tax contributed about 13.1% to
the total budget and the remaining difference is accounted for by correction mecha-
nisms. Accordingly, the countries’ financial contributions to the EU budget relative
to their income display very little heterogeneity.20 Hence, in our main analysis we
abstract from the relatively minor differences on the financing side to isolate the
effects of place-based policies in the counterfactual analyses. The tax rate τn = τ is
obtained from the government budget (12) constraint equating transfer expenditure
and total tax revenue:
τ
∑
n∈N
wnLn =
∑
n∈N
LnTn. (23)
As a robustness check we collected information about the financial contributions to
19The classical reference for an efficiency loss of taxation is Harberger (1964), which estimated
that tax revenue decreases by 2.5% in presence of a labor income tax instead of a lump-sum tax.
Feldstein (1999) argues that this is heavily underestimated and provides himself an excess burden
of 30%, which we see as a lower bound. Thus, we run our simulations with values κy = {0.7, 0.975}
and interpret the corners as high vs. low excess burden.
20Correction mechanisms have been applied for United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark
and Ireland. Information about specific contributions to the regional policy budget is not available,
but the EU discloses countries’ overall payments to the EU budget which are very similar when
weighted by the countries’ income. In contrast, the share of regional transfers in local GDP (at
NUTS2 level) ranged from 0.0004 percent (UK, London) to 4.6 percent (Hungary, Northern Great
Plain).
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the EU budget and set taxes equal to country specific tax rates τn = τc which are
proxied by the the national contribution divided by GNI. In this case, we introduce
a scaling parameter ν to ensure that the government budget constraint is fulfilled
i.e., ν
∑
n∈N wnLnτc =
∑
n∈N LnTn.
Transportation costs: We use equation (5) and information on TravelT imeri
together with parameter estimates for θ and β to obtain expected transportation
costs (dni). Using GIS software we identify adjacent NUTS2 regions and compute
the elements of the adjacency matrix (D˜) based on road TravelT imeri between
the centroids of the respective regions which is provided by the RRG Database.
The latter contains detailed information on different speed limits, slope gradients,
congestion etc..21 The variable TravelT imeri is measured in hours travelled on
roads in the years 1999, 2006, and 2013 for the respective periods. By minimizing
the sum of squared errors between observed freight and gravity equation (9), we
estimate the factor converting travel time to trade cost β. For this we need data
on bilateral road freight among NUTS2 regions and set parameter values for the
trade elasticity σ = 5 and heterogeneity of traders θ = 136.13.22 The former stems
from the European Transport Policy Information System (ETIS) for the year 2010
and we parameterize the elasticity of substitution (σ) and trade heterogeneity (θ)
according to estimations obtained by Simonovska and Waugh (2014) and Allen and
Arkolakis (2016).
The non-linear least square estimates of our gravity equation provides a value
21Note that we assume regions maintaining a ferry connection to be adjacent in order to ensure a
comprehensive transport network and trade between the EU continent and the islands. Information
about ferry connections is obtained from openstreetmap.org. We exclude the following remote
islands (NUTS2 codes in parentheses): Madeira (PT30), Ac¸ores (PT20), Canary Islands (ES70)
and French overseas territories (FR91, FR92, FR93, FR94).
22The elasticity of substitution is within the range of accepted parameter values in the trade
literature and equivalent to Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017). Simonovska and Waugh (2014)
estimated a trade elasticity of −4 which yields σ = 5. Desmet et al. (2016) and Redding and
Rossi-Hansberg (2017) consider trade across countries and use σ = 4 as estimated by Bernard
et al. (2003) on the basis of plant-level data in the U.S. manufacturing sector. In contrast, Allen
and Arkolakis (2014) focus on trade within a country and use σ = 9. Evidence on the trader’s
heterogeneity θ is scarce and only estimates of Allen and Arkolakis (2016) exists.
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of β = 0.068. Figure A.1 in the appendix depicts a strong correlation of -0.709
between demeaned freight data and trade costs with estimated β.23 Our estimate is
slightly higher compared to the results of Allen and Arkolakis (2016) which likely
due differences in the institutions and geography of our setting. First, trade and
geographic barriers might be higher compared to the US which would result in a
higher factor converting travel time to trade costs. Second, transportation links are
much shorter for NUTS2 regions than for major cities located at the US Interstate
Highway System in Allen and Arkolakis (2016). We refer to our Section A.1.1 in
the appendix for a more detailed discussion of the estimation of β.
Location fundamentals: Equations (10), (16), (17), and (21) characterize the
equilibrium. We substitute the data described above, set the Fre´chet parameter of
idiosyncratic location tastes to  = 3 and invert the model to recover the location fun-
damental of the model {an, pini, Bn/mn}. The latter parameterization is in accordance
with Bryan and Morten (2015) and Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017). Finally,
in order to separate local amenities from migration costs, we use information about
local life satisfaction provided by the OECD. Note that the counterfactual simula-
tions are independent from the quantification of life satisfaction as this data is only
used to disentangle the role of migration costs from local consumption amenities.
A detailed discussion of the derivation of location fundamentals and data sources is
presented in Appendix A.4 and A.5.
Transfer elasticity of production amenities and travel time: We estimate
transfer elasticities based on fixed effects regressions and a regression discontinuity
design. In the latter case we exploit the fact that a substantial share of regional
transfers (Objective 1 transfers) are paid according to an allocation rule that gives
rise to a discontinuity: Regions are eligible for the highest transfer intensity if their
per-capita GDP falls below 75% of the EU average in some well defined years prior
to the respective budgeting period (see Becker et al. 2010). We estimate these
23We demean both variables to absorb importer and exporter fixed effects as shown in gravity
equation (9).
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elasticities based on data for all three budgeting periods. Accordingly, we recover
regions’ production amenities for 1993-99, 1999-06, 2007-13 separately and estimate
κa based on the pooled data. This allows us to exploit changes in transfer inten-
sities over time in addition to the cross-sectional variation and improve the causal
identification of the transfer elasticities. Note that when considering periods prior
to 2007-13 we set tax rates to zero for observations that were then not a member of
the EU. In the benchmark specification we assume full rivalry of public investments
in production amenities, ξ = 1. In contrast, for the transfer elasticity of transport
costs we use non-rivalry (ξ = 0) as the benchmark. We choose these two corner cases
as per-capita transfers are mostly relevant for production enhancing capital invest-
ments which tend to be rival, whereas newly built transport infrastructure reduces
the costs of transportation independently of the number of users as long as a certain
threshold of usage is not reached. While we cannot directly test these assumption,
we estimate the elasticities κa and κd for varying values of ξ ∈ {0, ..., 1} and per-
form model selection based on the Akaike information criterion which supports our
assumptions. The benchmark results for the estimates of both transfer elasticities
are displayed in Table A.1 in Appendix A. It is evident that higher regional transfer
intensities increase production amenities and decrease road travel time. For our
quantitative analysis we employ the benchmark estimates of the fixed-effects model
and set κa = 0.763 and κd = 0.00605.24
An overview of our recovered variables is depicted in Figure 2. A number of
observations stand out: First, wages are lowest in the east and south of Europe,
whereas production amenities are highest in the core, also in Scandinavia and gen-
erally in cities. Second, land rents are evidently highest in cities and tend to be
relatively high in the UK, northern Italy and southern Germany compared to areas
with low land prices in Central and Eastern Europe. Third, Germany and East-
ern Europe display a high share of contributions to the global portfolio indicating a
trade surplus while low shares of global investments in Greece and Portugal result in
24Note that these elasticities for production amenities and travel time are not directly comparable
with prior estimates in the literature focusing on aggregate GDP or employment.
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Figure 2: Overview of estimated and recovered variables
(a) Share global portfolio (ιn) (b) Trade costs (
∑
i dni) (c) Wages (wn)
(d) Price of land (rn) (e) Production amenities (an) (f) Location amenities (Bn)
(g) Own trade share (pinn) (h) Migration costs (mn) (i) Price index (Pn)
Note: The figures depict quantiles of the reported variables. A darker shading in the map indicates a higher value.
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a trade deficit. Fourth, migration entry costs are highest in the Netherlands, Scan-
dinavia, Austria, and parts of Germany whereas workers find it relatively easy to
emigrate to the South and East of Europe. Fifth, the price index strongly correlates
with the geographical market access as measured by the sum of trade costs. These
patterns are well in line with stylized facts about economic geography in Europe
and suggest that the model performs well in matching the distribution of economic
activity.
Table 1 provides information on all parameters entering our Model. For parame-
ters that we cannot estimate based on our data we refer to conventional values from
the existing literature. Note that we perform numerous sensitivity checks running
our simulations with different parameter constellations and conclude that our quali-
tative results are robust to the choice of parameters within the usual range reported
in the literature.
Table 1: Estimation and calibration of parameters
Description Par. Value Reference
Efficiency of wage subsidies κy {0.7, 0.975} Harberger (1964), Feldstein (1999)
Elasticity of prod. amenities κa 0.397 own estimation
Elasticity of transport infrastructure κd 0.006 own estimation
Rivalry of public investment ξ {0,1} -
Share of consumption expenditure α 0.75 Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011)
Elasticity of substitution σ 5 Simonovska and Waugh (2014)
Heterogeneity of preferences  3 Monte et al. (2016)
Factor converting TTri to d˜ri β 0.068 own estimation
Heterogeneity of traders θ 136.13 Allen and Arkolakis (2016)
The table reports estimated and calibrated parameters entering our model. Values specified in curly brackets are assumed to be
lower or upper bounds.
5 Simulation and counterfactual analysis
We use the equilibrium system to undertake model based counterfactual analyses of
EU regional policy.25 We derive counterfactual changes in wages, trade shares and
25The equilibrium is characterized by (10), (16), (17), and (21).
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population shares which provide – jointly with direct effects of transfers on produc-
tivity and income – sufficient statistics of the welfare effects of regional policy. A
counterfactual change is denoted as xˆ = x
′
x
, where x is the observed variable and x′
is the unobserved counterfactual value of x. We discuss counterfactual simulations
where transfers enter in three ways. First, transfers influence the equilibrium via
nominal wage subsidies raising income (yˆn). Second, transfers impact transportation
costs and thereby alter trade costs (dˆni) and regions’ market access. Third, invest-
ments in production amenities yield a shift in production amenities (aˆn) which re-
duce prices of varieties produced in recipient regions. According to expected utility
equation (20) the change in welfare across regions is given by:
Ê[V ] =
(
1
pˆinn
) α
σ−1
(
yˆnaˆn
wˆndˆnn
)α (
λˆn
) α
σ−1−(1−α)− 1
. (24)
From this equation it is evident that a full cost-benefit analysis should not only
consider direct effects of transfers (yˆn, aˆn, dˆnn) in the recipient region but also account
for changes in trade share, population and local wages. These changes are derived
by making use of the full system of counterfactual equilibrium equation described
in Appendix B.
We isolate effects of different transfer mechanisms by studying three counter-
factual situations: First, we analyze the effect of abandoning EU regional transfers
altogether and set the corresponding tax rates to zero. The resulting outcome pro-
vides a welfare measure of EU regional policy. In a second counterfactual analysis
we show how the spatial equilibrium would change if per-capita transfers were dis-
tributed equally. In this case, the level of transfers is comparable to the observed
one and deviations in welfare are attributed to the unequal distribution of transfers
across regions. Hence, this counterfactual provides a measurement of how efficiently
the EU distributes transfers compared to a naive rule that gives everybody the
same. Third, we derive the optimal allocation of transfers for each type of transfer
separately as well as for the sum of transfer channels. This allows us to quantify
potential efficiency gains from redistribution and to derive the factors that render
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a type of transfer efficient in some regions and inefficient in others. In all our sim-
ulations we keep tax rates constant such that the optimality criterion focuses on
the distribution and design of transfers rather than the size of the program. Before
we discuss the counterfactual experiments in detail it is instructive to analyze thee
marginal welfare effects of different transfer types across regions.
5.1 Marginal welfare effects of transfers
We decompose the marginal welfare effects of transfers in four components: the di-
rect effect of transfers, the price index effect through adjustment in wages and the
effects via changes in own trades shares and local population shares. Totally differ-
entiating expected welfare (E[V ]) with respect to transfers illustrates the weights
put on these components:
d lnE[Vn] =− α
σ − 1 d ln pinn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Adjustment
own trade share
+α (d ln yn + d ln an − d ln dnn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effects
−α d lnwn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price index
effect
+ (
α
σ − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Agglomeration
force
− (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dispersion
force
− 1
︸︷︷︸
Taste
heterogeneity
) d lnλn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in
population
.
(25)
The first welfare implication is common across a wide range of trade models and
is due to changes in terms of trade which result in adjustments in own trade share
as described in Arkolakis et al. (2012). Transfers affect local prices leading to a
deterioration in terms of trade. This effect on welfare increases with the weight
people put on consumption of the composite good (higher α) and decreases with the
substitutability of foreign goods by local varieties (higher σ).
Second, direct effects of transfers are unambiguously positive as they raise local
income, productivity or reduce local trade costs. This part of the marginal welfare
effect is characterized by decreasing marginal returns of transfers which is reflected
in the fact that percentage changes of per-capita income, productivity or trade costs
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enter the equation. For instance, a unit increase of transfers results in a higher
percentage gain in local income if the prevailing income level is low. Similarly,
regions contributing a high share of the local rent income to the global portfolio
display a smaller direct effect of transfers because a share ιn of the increase in land
values will be passed over to residents of other regions.
Third, as local income increases, local production expands, pays higher wages
which in turn translates into increases in the price index of this region. Thus,
this negatively affects welfare as local goods become relatively more expensive. This
negative effect amplifies with the weight people assign to the composite consumption
good (high α).
Fourth, changes in population affect welfare through agglomeration forces, dis-
persion forces and heterogeneity of location tastes. As population concentrates in a
location the measure of local varieties expands which in the presence of trade costs
makes the location more attractive. The effect attenuates the lower the elasticity of
substitution (low σ) and it amplifies the higher the weight on the composite con-
sumption good (high α). A population inflow in a location is accompanied by an
increase in land prices which in turn leads to less housing consumption. This ef-
fect on welfare is amplified the higher people weight the non-tradable housing good
(low α). If workers have relatively heterogeneous tastes for regions (low ) it is
more likely that a large fraction of the individuals entering the regions have a low
amenity draw and therefore face a reduction in indirect utility. In the extreme case
with homogeneous tastes (→∞) there are no costs in terms of amenity mismatch.
In accordance with the literature on quantitative economic geography we restrict
the parameter space to ensure that the agglomeration force is dominated by the
dispersion forces i.e. that the last channel is always negative.26
In the following we conduct simulation experiments to quantify the spatial dis-
tribution of marginal welfare effects for each type of transfer. In particular we shock
every region separately with a marginal transfer unit and obtain welfare changes
26As discussed in Section 3.6 this implies ασ−1 < (1− α) + 1 .
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relative to the situation without transfers. The government budget necessary for
this experiment is negligible and we ensure that the relative per-capita tax burden
remains constant across regions. To isolate the marginal utility gain by transfer
type we eliminate the potential responses of the respective other transfer types by
alternately setting two out of the three transfer elasticity parameters (κy, κa, κd) to
zero.
Figure 3 illustrates the heterogenous distribution of welfare changes for the three
transfer types and reveals the characteristics that determine the utility gain from
transfers. In panel a) we consider wage subsidies and observe a strong positive ef-
fect on welfare in peripheral and relatively poor regions. Overall, the welfare change
of a wage subsidy is highest in Eastern European regions and lowest for French,
British and Nordic regions. In contrast, in panel b) it is evident that investments
in transportation infrastructure are most effective in the core. Panel c) displays the
effectiveness of investments in production amenities and shows a mixed pattern of
local marginal welfare effects. In this case some relatively poor regions but also some
central regions exhibit high welfare gains. This reflects the fact that the marginal
gain from an investment in production amenities is higher at low productivity places
but positive spillovers via the price index are more pronounced in central regions.
While this analysis is providing first insights into the optimal distribution of trans-
fers, non-linearities in the model may imply that a mechanism allocating transfers
sequentially to the region that just exhibits the highest marginal welfare gain may
not necessarily deliver the welfare optimal distribution.
5.2 No-transfer scenario
Next, we evaluate the welfare effects in a no-transfer scenario which would apply if
the European Union abandoned it’s place-based policy scheme all together. Hence,
we set both transfers and tax rates to zero. Figure B.1 in the Appendix illustrates
the changes in the four components of the marginal welfare effect as derived in
equation (25). Expectedly, we find that productivity and income losses would be
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Figure 3: Marginal welfare effect of transfers
(a) Wage subsidy (b) Investment in transport infrastructure
(c) Investment in production amenities
Note: We refer to a unit increase of per-capita transfers in panel (a) wage subsidies and (b) production amenity
investments, whereas in panel (c) transport infrastructure investments we refer to a marginal increase in the absolute
transfer level. The non-rival nature of transport infrastructure investments would otherwise yield a much higher marginal
welfare effect in densely populated regions. The figure depicts marginal welfare changes reported by quantiles. A darker
shading represents a stronger effect, whereas a green (red) color illustrates a positive (negative) effect.
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most pronounced in Southern and Eastern Europe where the per-capita transfers
are the highest. In contrast the change in transportation costs due to suspending
transfers would be most pronounced in the Benelux countries, England, and some
parts of Germany and Austria. These direct effects would translate into changes
in wages, own trade shares and population shares. In particular, our simulation
suggests that substantially more workers would relocate from Southern and Eastern
European regions to the Center and North of Europe. Overall, our model predicts
for the ten countries with the highest net emigration that they would lose about
7% of their population when moving from the observed equilibrium to a situation
without transfers.27 At the same time average nominal per-capita income in the
considered regions of these ten countries would be about 4% lower than in the
observed equilibrium. Accordingly, our findings suggest that EU regional transfers
were quite effective in reducing migration from new member states in the East to
the center. On average, abolishing transfers would also significantly reduce trade
and increases own trade shares by 5 percentage points. Summing up over all welfare
components we find that this policy change would yield a significant welfare loss
compared to the observed distribution of transfers.
How did the individual types of transfers contribute to the welfare gain and the
reduction in inequality compared to a non-transfer scenario? In Table 2 we sum-
marize the effects of individual transfer types on welfare and regional inequality as
measured by Gini indices. Panel a) isolates the wage subsidies as a mechanism of
regional transfers, panels b) and c) isolate the effects via production amenity gains
and changes in transportation costs while panel d) considers all three transfer chan-
nels simultaneously. In columns (2) we report the change in welfare and inequality
obtained with the observed spatial distribution of transfers relative to the coun-
terfactual without transfers. Assuming that productivity and transportation costs
remain unaffected by transfers, we find that the observed distribution of transfers
raised welfare by 0.15%. Reductions in regional inequality concern the second ob-
27These countries are BG, RO, MT, HU, LV, EE, SK, CZ, GR, PL. The share of population of
these 10 countries in the total European population is currently about 9.5%.
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jective of regional policy. In this regard it turns out that the observed distribution
of wage subsidies has in fact reduced inequality in terms of population distribution,
nominal income and wages as well as real income.
Analogously, assuming that the only direct effect of transfers is to raise local
productivity, we find that the welfare gain due to the observed allocation of transfers
amounts to 1.20%. A significant reduction in inequality is obtained as the production
enhancing effects of transfers are concentrated in the periphery.
Finally, panel c) of Table 2 isolates the effects of transport infrastructure invest-
ments. Transport infrastructure represents not only a major part of expenditure
but also contributed to the largest welfare gain which amounts to about 1.52%.28
However, transportation infrastructure investments have increased regional inequal-
ity in terms of nominal and real income compared to the counterfactual without
transfers while they have decreased inequality in the population distribution. The
reason is that observed transportation investments were primarily directed to cities
in the poor and peripheral countries. Accordingly, dispersion in population distribu-
tion was reduced as less cross-country emigration from South and Eastern European
countries occurred as a result of the transfers. Neglecting productivity and direct
income effects, these transfers have increased income inequality within countries as
some more accessible regions have gained disproportionally.
Considering the total effect of transfers via all three channels (panel d) of Table 2)
we obtain a welfare increase of about 3% and an unambiguous reduction in regional
inequality compared to the no-transfer scenario.
5.3 Uniform distribution of transfers
Another natural candidate for a policy experiment is to fix tax rates and distribute
the government budget uniformly across regions. This naive distribution allows
28In the programming period considered, investments in transport infrastructure amounted to
about 14% of total expenditure.
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Table 2: Welfare and inequality effects of transfers
(a) Wage subsidies (b) Production amenities
Equal Observed Optimal Equal Observed Optimal
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Welfare (Vˆn) 0.05% 0.15% 0.45% 1.23% 1.20% 1.26%
Ĝini(Ln) -0.12% -0.48% -0.43% -2.35% -2.40% -2.49%
Ĝini(yn) -0.36% -1.46% -1.66% -3.19% -3.48% -3.37%
Ĝini(wn) -0.11% -0.37% -0.81% -3.57% -3.86% -3.78%
Ĝini(yn/Pαn r
1−α
n ) -0.16% -0.66% -0.68% -1.55% -1.71% -1.65%
(c) Transportation infrastructure (d) All transfers
Equal Observed Optimal Equal Observed Optimal
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Welfare (Vˆn) 1.68% 1.52% 1.72% 3.34% 3.23% 3.50%
Ĝini(Ln) -0.31% -0.34% -0.32% -2.69% -3.03% -2.89%
Ĝini(yn) 0.27% 0.16% 0.30% -3.21% -4.55% -3.96%
Ĝini(wn) 0.40% 0.27% 0.44% -3.24% -3.84% -3.58%
Ĝini(yn/Pαn r
1−α
n ) 0.21% 0.08% 0.27% -1.45% -2.16% -1.75%
The table compares outcomes relative to the no transfer equilibrium. Columns 1 refer to an equal distribution of per-capita transfers,
columns 2 refer to the observed distribution of transfers, and columns 3 refer to the optimal distribution of total transfers (panel
d) and individual transfer types (panels a, b, c ). Panel a) considers transfer effects only via wage subsidies, panel b) considers
transfer effects only via production amenities and panel c) considers only effects via investments in transport infrastructure. The
first line shows the welfare changes in general equilibrium. Lines 2 to 5 show the changes in regional inequality as measured by the
Gini indices. In all counterfactual experiments we keep the tax rates constant at the observed level.
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us to isolate the welfare implications of the regional distribution of transfers while
keeping the level of taxes and thus regional policy interventions constant. While
we are confident to identify the causal effect of transfers on the level of production
amenities and travel time based on our quasi-experimental design, we have no em-
pirical information about the distortions that arise from raising the budget. Thus,
we assume a constant marginal excess burden of taxation in accordance with previ-
ous literature (see Section 4). Accordingly, we stress in our analysis to compare the
quantitative implications of different distributions of transfers and put less weight
on the interpretation of the welfare effect obtained for different levels of transfers.
We focus on a long-run equilibrium where government spending and expendi-
tures have to be balanced. Even though tax rates remain constant at the observed
level in this experiment, the total transfer budget may differ somewhat between the
observed and equal distribution of transfers. This happens since changes in popu-
lation and wages influence tax payments to the government budget. An alternative
approach that yields similar results would be to fix the budget and adjust the tax
rates accordingly. The counterfactual changes in local outcomes of this experiment
are depicted in Figure B.2 in the Appendix and the consequences for welfare and
regional inequality are reported in column (1) of Table 2.
Moving from the observed to a uniform distribution of transfers, our model again
predicts significant immigration from Eastern and Southern European countries to
the Core and Northern parts of Europe. Yet, the migration response would be less
pronounced than in the case without transfers as the ten countries with the highest
emigration would lose only about 2% of their population compared to the observed
equilibrium. The reduction in nominal per-capita income across regions in these
countries would be about 2.1% compared to the observed equilibrium. From an
aggregate welfare perspective the naive policy scheme dominates the observed one.
By summing up all welfare components we estimate an increase in welfare of about
3.4% when moving from the observed to a uniform distribution of transfers (see panel
d) of Table 2). This increase in welfare is obtained via production increases and
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reductions in transportation costs. A uniform per-capita distribution of transfers
would allocate more funds to the center and thereby reach an increase in welfare
of 0.16 percentage points via the trade costs channel (see panel c) of Table 2) and
a small increase of 0.03 percentage points via the productivity channel (see panel
b) of Table 2). Only with regard to wage subsidies the existing distribution is
more efficient than a uniform distribution as is evident from panel a) of Table 2.
Overall, the comparison of columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 illustrates that the existing
distribution goes further in reducing regional inequalities than an equal distribution
but at the costs of lower efficiency. Hence, we conclude that the distribution of
transfers in the EU is overall less efficient than a naive approach that distributes
transfers equally across Europe while it reaches significantly lower inequality. From
a policy makers point of view the crucial question is whether there are efficiency
gains to be reached without compromising on the degree of regional cohesion.
5.4 Optimal distribution of transfers
In this section we derive the welfare optimal distribution of transfers and reveal fur-
ther welfare gains compared to the existing allocation of transfers. We refrain from
computing the optimal size of the transfer budget as this would be an immediate
consequence of our assumption about the efficiency parameter of transfers κy which
cannot be identified empirically with the data at hand.
The distribution of the marginal welfare effects presented in Section 5.1 already
reveal some general pattern of an optimal distribution, but non-linearities in the
model urge us to use a solver searching for the global solution. To maximize aggre-
gate welfare we use a “Mathematical Programming With Equilibrium Constraints”
(MPEC) approach as introduced by Su and Judd (2012) and applied by Ossa (2014)
and Ossa (2017) for optimal tariffs and subsidies. This numerical optimization rou-
tine maximizes regions’ welfare and uses the model’s equilibrium equations as con-
straints. For a detailed documentation of our numerical optimization approach we
refer to Section C in the appendix.
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We derive the optimal distributions of transfers for each type separately and
report the corresponding optimal welfare changes and impacts on regional inequality
in columns (3) of Table 2. Figure 4 shows the share of the total transfer budget a
regions should receive according to the welfare optimizing algorithm. From panel a)
it is evident that the optimal distribution of wage subsidies deviates significantly
from the observed one (see Figure 1). In particular, the welfare optimal policy
issues transfers to only a few regions in Eastern Europe while cutting subsidies in
most other recipient regions. A redistribution of wage subsidies according to our
optimal allocation yields a welfare gain of 0.45% compared to the no-transfer scenario
which is three times the gain achieved by the observed distribution. Importantly, the
efficiency gain can be achieved at an even lower degree of regional inequality in terms
of (real) income and population density. Focusing on transfers that operate via wage
subsidies to a small set of regions allows for an unambiguous welfare increase without
compromising regional inequality. Note that an increase in the budget would clearly
expand the number of recipient regions according to the welfare optimal policy.
For instance, we show in panel b) the resulting distribution that would apply if we
drastically increase tax rates by a factor of 50. In this case almost all regions would
receive some transfers but the optimal transfer intensity would still be the highest
in the periphery.
The optimal distribution of investments in transportation infrastructure is pre-
sented in panel d) and indicates a very different pattern. The highest shares of
the transfer budget are allocated to central regions in northern Italy, the Benelux
countries, Germany, and France. In order to maximize aggregate welfare, a transfer
scheme focusing on transport costs reductions exert the most significant spillover ef-
fects at central places. This implies a substantial reallocation of transfers compared
to the current scheme: The correlation coefficient between the regional distribution
according to the optimal scheme and the one of observed transfers under the of-
ficial heading ‘Transport infrastructure’ is only 0.13.29 Such a reallocation could
29Comparisons with the distributions of other transfers types yield similar correlations: 0.11 for
total transfers; 0.11 for wage subsidies; 0.4 for investments in production amenities.
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Figure 4: Optimal distribution of transfers
(a) Wage subsidies (b) Wage subsidies, high tax rates
(c) Investment in production amenities (d) Investment in transport infrastructure
Note: Panel a) shows the optimal distribution of wage subsidies at the observed tax rates. Panel b) also focuses on the optimal
distribution of wage subsidies but is calculated according to a much higher budget where tax rates are multiplied by 50. Panel
c) and d) show the optimal distributions of investments in production amenities and transportation infrastructure, respectively.
In these cases we hold tax rates constant at the observed level. The figures depict local shares of the total transfer volume
according to quantiles where a darker shading represents a higher transfer share.
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achieve an efficiency gain of about 0.2 percentage points compared to the existing
distribution. However, this welfare gain would come at a higher regional inequality.
With regard to investments in local production amenities the optimal pattern
is again more in line with the observed one. The maximization routine suggests
the highest transfer shares in Central and Eastern Europe, but also advises a broad
dispersion of transfers across European regions. The optimum is characterized by
a welfare gain of 0.06 percentage points compared to the observed one and reaches
a lower degree of regional inequality in terms of population density. However, the
resulting inequalities in terms of income are slightly higher than in the observed
distribution of transfers.
Finally, considering all transfer types, the welfare optimal scheme could realize
an efficiency gain of 0.27 percentage points compared to the observed one while
keeping tax rates constant. Hence, this mere improvement of the distribution of
transfers raises the welfare gain of the EU regional policy by about 8.36%. Notably
this comes at the costs of somewhat higher regional inequality.
6 Complementarity of transfer types
A conceptual understanding of the welfare effects of different regional transfer types
would allow for a superior design of place-based policies. However, explaining the
underlying forces is difficult as the model implies a complex mapping from location
fundamentals to welfare effects. A simple regression analysis aiming to explain the
role of location fundamentals for the marginal welfare effects in regional transfers
fails in our context. This is because location fundamentals enter in a highly non-
linear way and thus are likely to confound other coefficients in a linear regression.
Therefore, we conduct a simulation exercise, where we homogenize regions in terms
of all location fundamentals such that general equilibrium outcomes of marginal wel-
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fare effects of transfers are ex-ante identical across regions.30 Then, we alternately
set one of the location fundamentals to it’s recovered or observed value while keeping
all others constant and calculate the marginal welfare effects of transfer.31 This pro-
cedure allows us to make ceteribus paribus statements of how location fundamentals
impact the marginal welfare effects of regional transfers.
Before providing evidence on the role of location fundamental, it is instructive to
discuss opposing properties of our transfer types on price indexes. Recall that wage
subsidies raise local income directly, and local wages to a lower extent, as a certain
share of increases in nominal income is passed over to trading partners or to the
global portfolio. This ‘second-round’ increase of local wages impacts other regions
(neighbors) negatively because all varieties imported from the transfer recipient re-
gions become relatively more expensive. In contrast, gains in production amenities
or transportation infrastructure affect local price indexes directly and influence wel-
fare of other regions positively. In these cases income and wages only change in a
‘second-round’ such that overall positive spillovers dominate. Thus, wage subsidies
are more efficient when spent in low income regions where the marginal return of
consumption is high and in low accessibility regions where the negative spillovers via
price indices are less pronounced. Investments in production amenities and trans-
portation infrastructure are spent more efficiently in highly accessible regions as
these locations maximize the dispersion of the gains from such investments.
In Figure 5 we reveal important complementarities between the three investment
30We set all location fundamentals to the average values. In the case of trade costs this is not
possible as geography (i.e. location and the number of neighbors) matters for the calculation of
trade costs. This limitation results in a scattered pattern in Figure 5 panels b), d), and f) instead
of an exact relationship. However, the correlations are unambiguous such that this limitation is
not problematic for our simulation experiment.
31This exercise can also be interpreted as a difference-in-difference estimation of regional trans-
fers, where the first difference is the same for all regions. The average treatment effect in a
difference-in-difference estimation in our case is E[Uˆn,T,A|T = 1, A = 1] − E[Uˆn,T,A|T = 0, A =
1] − (E[Uˆn,T,A|T = 1, A = 0] − E[Uˆn,T,A|T = 0, A = 0]), where T = 1 indicates that region n got
a marginal amount of transfers and A = 1 denotes that all location fundamental are set to it’s
average value for all regions and A = 0 denotes that one specific location fundamental is set to it’s
observed value.
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Figure 5: Complementarities of regional transfers
Marginal welfare effect of wage subsidies
(a) Production amenity (an) (b) Sum of trade costs (
∑
i dni)
Marginal welfare effect of investments in production amenities
(c) Production amenity (an) (d) Sum of trade costs (
∑
i dni)
Marginal welfare effect of investments in transportation infrastructure
(e) Production amenity (an) (f) Sum of trade costs (
∑
i dni)
Note: The scale change in utility is normalized and utility differences can be compared. Increases or decrease in utility are not
relevant in this figure.
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types. The figures depict the respective marginal welfare effects against the distri-
butions of production amenities and geographical accessibility (e.g. sum of trade
costs). The correlations in panels a) and b) show that wage subsidies are most ef-
fective in regions with low productivity and low accessibility. These pattern are due
to decreasing marginal returns of consumption and negative spillovers dominating
for wage subsidies. Panels c) and d), show that investments in production ameni-
ties reach the highest welfare gains in fact in regions with low productivity and
low accessibility. The first result is due to decreasing marginal efficiency of trans-
fers as defined in equation (15). The latter result materializes because production
amenity gains should be directed to regions where the diffusion of positive spillovers
is maximized. Considering investments in transportation infrastructure (panels e)
and f)) we find the highest welfare gains in high productivity and high accessibility
regions. The first result is due to agglomeration economies – a high productivity
leads to dense population and a sizable home market which raises the benefits of
market integration. The latter is due to the positive spillovers via the transporta-
tion network: Central, highly accessible regions are relevant for trade between many
region pairs which have their least cost route in the proximity. Accordingly, an im-
provement of the infrastructure in central regions will be passed over to the effective
trade costs for a large share of other region pairs. Moreover, according to (14) the
percentage reduction of travel time following a marginal investment is higher for
adjacent region pairs with low travel time.
We report the role of the remaining location fundamentals that cannot be influ-
enced by regional transfers in Figures B.3, B.4, and B.5 in the Appendix. Location
attractiveness, residential land supply, and the share paid to global portfolio enter
positively into the marginal welfare effects of all three transfer types. The reasons
are intuitive as a social planner would aim to allocate individuals to places with
high consumption amenities and plenty of land available such as to leverage the
fundamental merits of locations and minimize congestion costs. A higher share of
contributions to the global portfolio implies that the income gains from transfers
are spread broader across regions. If regions are ceteris paribus identical a broad
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distribution generates a higher marginal welfare effect than a concentrated distribu-
tion due to decreasing marginal utility. Migration entry costs imply that a fraction
of utility melts away when entering a region. Thus, transfers should not attract
individual to regions with high migration entry costs as movers would experience a
significant utility reduction. These migration entry costs may for instance be inter-
preted as the adjustment costs due to a different language or climate. Put differently
our formulation of bilateral migration costs, implies that the marginal welfare effect
of transfers is higher at places with low emigration benefits that is at the places
where individuals are relatively immobile.
Table 3: Optimal investment location by transfer type
Local Sum of Location of
productivity trade costs optimal investment
(1) (2) (3)
Wage subsidies low high periphery
Production amenities low low mixed
Transport infrastructure high low core
The table shows which location characteristics are beneficial for welfare by our different transfer
types. The results are a summary of Figure 4 and 5.
The location characteristics that render transfers or different type most efficient
are summarized in Table 3 and related to the observed geography of economic ac-
tivity in the European Union. Wage subsidies would be most efficient in peripheral
regions of Europe that are on average characterized by lower productivity and and
accessibility. This fits relatively well with the observed distribution of transfers as
illustrated in Figure 1. Focusing on projects that aim at increasing productivity
and improving transportation infrastructure we conclude that the observed expen-
diture distribution does not coincide with the optimal one. Transport infrastructure
should clearly focus on the core and the optimal location of investment in produc-
tion amenities is somewhat mixed between the core and periphery of the EU but
less focused on the periphery than the observed one.
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7 Comparison between the general and partial
equilibrium responses to transfers
The model presented in this paper allows us to isolate different channels of a place-
based policy. A simple cost-benefit analysis capturing only direct effects of transfers
in recipient regions could lead to a significant misinterpretation of the welfare ef-
fects. According to (25) we define direct effects of transfers as changes in local
income, production amenities and own trade costs which can be identified by econo-
metric methods. However, changes in location fundamentals induce adjustments in
migration, trade and wages as captured by our general equilibrium model.
Table 4: General vs. partial equilibrium effects
GE Welfare (Vˆn) − PE Welfare (Vˆn)
Equal Observed Optimal
Wage subsidies -0.01 -0.02 -0.63
Production amenities -0.52 -0.54 -0.63
Transport infrastructure 1.81 1.66 1.84
All transfers 1.24 1.00 0.51
The table compares welfare changes as computed from our general equilibrium analysis to the
corresponding partial equilibrium welfare changes (see (25)). The differences are reported in
percentage points. The partial equilibrium changes exclude adjustments via migration, trade,
and local wages (price index) and are weighted by regions’ population shares.
Table 4 quantifies the differences between general and partial equilibrium re-
sponses to transfers. The results show that a policy-maker taking only partial
equilibrium effects into consideration, overestimates the welfare effects in case of
wage subsidies and production amenities. In case of investments in transportation
infrastructure the partial equilibrium in fact underestimates the aggregate welfare
change. These opposite assessments arises due to investments in transportation in-
frastructure affecting the general equilibrium not only via own trade costs but also
via reductions in travel time for other region pairs.32 This implies a further welfare
32Note that the adjustments in own trade costs are relatively minor because they are only caused
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gains that are not accounted for in partial equilibrium. In our application the latter
category of transfers turns out relatively important and accordingly changes in trade
costs are sizable. Thus, considering the welfare effects across all transfer types we
find that a partial equilibrium approach would underestimate the aggregate gains.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we present a novel quantitative analysis of the general equilibrium
effects of place-based policies in Europe. We integrate the three major types of re-
gional transfers, i.e. wage subsidies, investments in local production amenities and
investments in transportation infrastructure, into a rich economic geography frame-
work. The model performs well in matching important pattern of the distribution
of economic activity in Europe. Applying it to two decades of regional data, we
estimate the key parameters of the model and recover cross-sectional as well as time
variation in location fundamentals. In particular, for the causal identification of the
elasticities of local production amenities and trade costs with regard to transfers,
we exploit changes in the regional eligibility for EU transfers.
We then perform counterfactual experiments where we abandon transfers or
redistribute them uniformly across regions. Overall, we find that the EU place-
based policy led to a positive welfare effect of 3.23% compared to a scenario without
transfers. However, the policy does not realize the potential of distributing the
investments in a welfare optimizing way: A uniform distribution turns out to reach
a higher welfare level for two out of three transfer types than the EU’s current
scheme.
A further contribution concerns the derivation of the welfare optimal distribution
of transfers. Contrasting the optimal distributions with the observed ones provides
us with a quantification of the potential welfare gains that could be realized. In
total, switching to the optimal distribution could achieve efficiency gains of about
by traders having a taste for non-optimal routes, i.e. detours bypassing the own region.
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8.36%. Regarding the type of transfers, there is not one size fits all approach for
optimal distribution: While wage subsidies should be limited to the few poorest
regions, infrastructure investment should rather focus on the core regions. This
serves as a basis for our detailed derivation of the determinants for an optimal
transfer scheme and the complementarities of different transfer types. We show that
the investments in local production amenities and transportation infrastructure can
be leveraged by allocating them such as to maximize positive spillovers. This implies
a complementarity between these two transfer types. In contrast for wage subsidies
we show that negative spillovers dominate. Another dimension of heterogeneity in
the regional effectiveness of transfers might stem from variations in the quality of
local institution which is not accounted for in our current framework. Nevertheless
we believe that our systematic approach for an optimal transfer scheme may serve
as serve as guidelines for policy makers.
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Appendix
A Estimation and calibration
A.1 Trade costs (dni)
Trade costs are based on a framework developed in Allen and Arkolakis (2016). In the following
we describe how we derive expected trade costs (5) and discuss how we adapt their approach for
the EU. In Section A.1.1 we discuss how we convert travel time into trade costs and in Section
A.1.2 we compare our results to the ones obtained from an alternative approach to estimate trade
costs.
Trade is undertaken by a continuum of heterogeneous agents v who endogenously choose a path
p with length K to get from n to i. We specify cost of shipping a good from adjacent locations r
to i as a function of road travel time measured in hours33
d˜ri = e
β·TravelT imeni , (A.1)
where TravelT imeri is time travelled on roads from r to i and β is a factor converting travel time
into transport costs. Aggregate trade costs dˇni(p) from n to i are the product of the transport
costs along path p
dˇni(p) =
K∏
k=1
d˜pk−1,pk . (A.2)
Each trader faces a heterogenous path-specific taste ni(p, v) to ship a good from n to i, which is
assumed to be drawn i.i.d. from a Fre´chet distribution with shape parameter θ > 0. The total
costs of trader v travelling from n and i along path p are dˇni(p)ni(p, v). Let dni(v) indicate the
costs of trader v choosing the trader-specific least-cost path between n and i
dni(v) = min
p∈Pk,K≥0
dˇni(p)ni(p, v). (A.3)
We allow traders to choose any possible path to ship a good from n to i. The extent of mistakes
traders incur is governed by the shape parameter θ. The calibration of θ determines the possibility
of mistakes and randomness in the choice of routes. A higher value of θ indicates greater agreement
across traders, where in the limit case of no heterogeneity θ →∞ all traders choose the least-cost
route. Thus, the framework we described is a generalization of the least-costs approach used in
the previous literature and allows a trader to ship a good on second best routes.34 By using the
properties of the Fre´chet distribution as described in Eaton and Kortum (2002), expected trade
costs dni consist of trade costs realized on all possible paths
dni ≡ Ev[dni(v)] = c
 ∞∑
K=0
∑
p∈K
dˇni(p)
−θ
− 1θ , (A.4)
33If n and i are not adjacent, then tni = ∞ indicating that there is no direct connection. We
also assume that tnn = ∞ and exclude outgoing paths starting and ending in the same location.
However, traders can ship goods from n to n with no trade costs. With our definition of tnn =∞
this is the only path of length zero.
34Studies modeling trade costs by using a fast marching algorithm or least costs approaches are
Donaldson (2017), Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) or Allen and Arkolakis (2014).
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where c ≡ Γ( θ−1θ ). Given the extreme value distribution, the probability a trader chooses path p
and goes from n to i is given by
pidni(p) = Pr(dˇni(p) ≤ min{dˇni(p)},∀ p ∈ PK ,K ≥ 0) =
dni(p)
−θ∑∞
K=0
∑∞
p′∈Pij,K dni(p
′)−θ
. (A.5)
As shown in Allen and Arkolakis (2016) expected trade costs can be expressed as a Neumann series
with weighted adjacency matrix D˜ = [d˜−θni ]:
d−θni = c
−θ
∞∑
K=0
D˜Kni, (A.6)
where D˜Kni is the (n, i)’s element of adjacency matrix D˜ to the power of K.
35 The Neumann
series converges. Reformulating the above equation we yield an analytical relationship between
the transport infrastructure matrix and expected trade cost
dni = cb
− 1θ
ni . (A.7)
This expression accounts that traders are minimizing heterogenous trader- and path-specific trade
costs. By applying the matrix calculus described in Allen and Arkolakis (2016) we derive from
equation (A.5) the probability of using link tkl when shipping a good from i to n
piklni =
(
1
c
dni
dnkd˜kldli
)θ
. (A.8)
This equation provides a clear intuition: The term dni in the numerator reflects the expected trade
costs from n to i, whereas the denominator are expected trade costs from n to i along link kl. The
more it costs to ship a good through link kl relative to the unconstrained route, the less likely it is
that traders use this link. The probability of making wide detours decreases with higher degrees
of trade routes agreement (high θ). As a result, the reduction of trade costs is more relevant
the closer the improved bilateral link on the optimal route. Hence, an investment reducing direct
trade costs of link d˜kl will have consequences for expected bilateral trade costs of all other regions.
These effects are the more pronounced the closer the direct link to the unconstraint one and thus
investments only marginally affect effective trade costs of distant links.
A.1.1 Estimation of trade costs
In the following we describe how we use the framework described above in order to compute
expected trade costs dni according to equation (A.7). First, we describe how we derive direct
transport costs d˜ni from (4). With GIS software we identify adjacent NUTS2 regions. Then, we
assume regions maintaining a ferry connection are also adjacent to each other. From openstreet
map we take ferry connections in order to ensure a comprehensive transport network and connect
the EU continent with the islands.36 Data on TravelT imeni sources from the RRG GIS Database,
35Note, D˜ni = 0 indicates no connections between n and i, D˜ni = 1 indicates a costs-less
connection and D˜ni ∈ (0, 1) indicates a costly connection.
36We connect the EU continent with Islands such as British, Nordic, Spanish or Italian Islands.
This leaves us with one region which is not connected to the network and for which we assume
a ferry connection to the closest region. This connection in fact exist, but is not reported in
openstreetmap. We also exclude remote islands such as Madeira PT30, Ac¸ores PT20, Canary
Islands ES70 or French overseas territories FR91,FR92, FR93, FR94.
54
which contains detailed information on different speed limits, slope gradients, congestion etc.. The
variable TravelT imeni measures time (in hours) travelled on roads from centroid of n to centroid
of i and is obtain at the NUTS2 level. To proceed and obtain trade costs dni, we use equation
(A.7) as well as information on TravelTime d˜ni and parameters θ and β.
As Truck-specific trade data does not exist for Europe we set the Fre´chet parameter governing
heterogeneity of traders θ = 136.13 according to the estimates by Allen and Arkolakis (2016).
With this information and the data on TravelT imeni we can specificy adjency matrix D˜. Gravity
equation (9) and the definition of trade cost (A.7) can be used to estimate the factor converting
travel time to trade cost β. We perform a non-linear least squares estimation and minimize the
sum of squared residuals between observed and implied trade by the model
min
β
∑
n,i∈N
(
log(XDatani )− β0 −
σ − 1
θ
log([I − D˜]−1ni )− log(δn)− log(ηi)
)2
. (A.9)
In order to get rid of the constant β0 and dummies δn and ηn capturing importer and exporter
fixed effects, we demean trade and trade costs accordingly. Data on bilateral road freight XDATAni
among NUTS2 regions stem from the European Transport Policy Information System (ETIS). We
estimate a value of β = 0.068. This estimate is higher compared to Allen and Arkolakis (2016),
which we can be explained by shorter transport links in our study resulting in wider detours
and a higher factor converting travel time to trade costs. Figure A.1, panel a) depicts a strong
correlation of -0.709 between the freight data and the values of trade costs obtained from the
estimation approach described above. In the figure we demean the freight data and the values for
trade costs in order to correct for origin and destination specific fixed effects.
A.1.2 Estimation of trade costs based on Poisson-PML (dPPMLni )
As an alternative approach we follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and use a poisson pseudo-
maximum-likelihood (Poisson-PML) estimator to estimate the gravity equation (9). This approach
controls for heteroscedasticity in the estimation of the parameters in log-linearized models. By
substituting the solution for goods prices pni and collecting exporter and importer specific terms
in respective fixed effects (ξ and ζ) our estimated equation writes:
Xni =
(
ξnd
1−σ
ni ζi
)
ni, (A.10)
where ni denotes the error term which enters multiplicatively. Moreover, Fally (2015) show that
an Poisson-PML estimation of a gravity equation with exporter and importer fixed effects of the
form above is consistent with a structural approach that imposes further restrictions on exporter
and importer terms. Similar as in Anderson and Yotov (2010) we assume that the unobserved
trade costs are a function of the following observables
d1−σni = e
β1ln(TravelT imeni)+β2CBni+β3CIBni+β4SCni+β5TWIni (A.11)
where ln(TravelT imeni) measures logarithmic road travel-time between a region dyad, CBni and
CIBni capture the presence of common border and common international border between the
regions n and i, SCni indicates whether regions n and i belong to the same country and TWIni
is unity for internal trades i.e. when i = n. Data on bilateral freight and road travel time among
NUTS2 regions stem from the same source as described above.
Panels b) and c) compare our benchmark estimated for trade costs dni with the ones obtained
from more traditional PPML or purely distance based approaches. Overall, the measured seem to
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capture relatively similar information as is evident from the high correlations between the trade
costs obtained from the different approaches.
Figure A.1: Comparison of trade cost
(a) Modeled trade costs and ob-
served freight (b) PPML estimates (c) Distance based
Note: We use our estimates of β = 0.068 for the factor converting travel time to trade costs. This estimate minimizes sum of square
residuals between demeaned log freight and demeaned log trade costs data. Correlation between modeled trade costs and traditional
approaches in panel (b) is 0.8 and in panel (c) is equal to 0.7.
A.2 Estimation of transfer elasticites (κa, κd)
In Table A.1 we report the results of the regression described in Section 4. We estimate equations
(14) and (15) employing recovered data for production amenities and information about regional
transfers from the central EU budget. Our counterfactual simulations are based on the elasticities
of transfers (κa and κd) obtained from the fixed effects specifications reported in columns (1) and
(3). The specifications based on the regression discontinuity design (RDD) in columns (2) and (4)
exploit the fact that only regions with a per-capita income of less than 75% of the EU average
(measured in well specified years prior to the begin of the respective budgeting period and in PPP
terms) are eligible for the highest transfer intensity referred to as Objective 1 funds. Intuitively,
identification rests on the idea that focusing on regions on both sides but at close proximity of
the threshold generates quasi-random assignment of transfers. Applying the estimates obtained
by the RDD to the average transfer intensities of Objective 1 regions yields transfer elasticities
of productivity and travel time that are well in line with those obtained from the fixed effects
specifications.
A.3 Trade balance
Figure A.2 presents the calibration of the share of payments to the global portfolio (ι) discussed
in Section 4 as well as observed and predicted trade balances. Regions characterized by high
trade surpluses as for instance North and South Holland (NL32 and NL33) contribute most of
their land rents to the global portfolio. We observe some small deviations between the observed
and predicted trade balances which is due to the bounds of ιn ∈ (0, 1). An example where this
parametric restriction is biding concerns regions with a substantial trade surplus which should
spend more than their returns from land to the global portfolio. Overall we capture most of the
heterogeneity of trade imbalances as is evident from the high correlation of 0.99 between modeled
and predicted trade balances.
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Table A.1: Effect of place-based transfers on bilateral adjacent travel time and
production amenity
Trans. infrastructure κd Production amenities κa
FE RDD FE RDD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Transfers) -0.006∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗
(0.002) (0.013)
Ln(Transfers)/Capita 0.397∗∗ 2.078∗∗
(0.185) (0.826)
Observations 1,884 1,884 708 674
No. regions 244 244 264 245
F first-stage . 2495.016 . 9.973
AIC -7190.101 5113.467 -2376.733 -270.943
R2 0.329 0.153 0.536 0.558
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes No Yes No
Polynomial . 2 . 2
Covariates include a dummy indicating new member countries of the European Union as well as
a dummy for membership in the Schengen area (which abolished border controls). The RDD
specifications generally include asymmetric second order polynomial functions of the forcing vari-
able which determined eligibility for Objective 1 transfers, i.e. per-capita GDP relative to the
EU average in the relevant years. Robust standard errors in brackets, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
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Figure A.2: Comparison between modeled and observed trade balance and contri-
bution to global portfolio ιn
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Note: Blue and red bars illustrate the observed ΥData and solved trade balance ΥModel = ιnHnrn +
χLn, respectively. Diamonds show the contribution to the global portfolio ιn that minimize the least
square deviations between the modelled and observed values.
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A.4 Production amenity (an) and trade shares (pini)
Substituting equilibrium equations (10) in (21) yields
a1−σi = αw
−σ
i
∑
n∈N
d1−σni λnyn∑
k∈N λk
(
dnkwk
ak
)1−σ . (A.12)
By using equation (A.12) we can recover location i’s production amenity an, given data for {λn, yn}
and substituting parameters {σ, α}, estimates {dni} as well as the already recovered information on
{wn}. The solution to this equation is unique (up to scale) as follows immediately from Proposition
6 in Redding (2016). Once we know regions’ production amenity we can recover bilateral trade
shares according to (10). Again we substitute data for {λn}, estimates {dni} as well as recovered
information on {wn, an}. The solution to this equation is unique (up to scale) as follows from the
theorems of Fujimoto and Krause (1985) for this type of equation.
A.5 Location amenities (Bn) and migration costs (mn)
According to equation (18) location amenities and migration costs prevent people from consuming
the highest attainable real income. In order to disentangle these two factors we substitute real
income in (20) and obtain utility for stayers which is independent of migration costs
E[Vnn] = L¯
1
 γδ (Bn)
1

(
anyn
dnnwn
)α
piα/(1−σ)nn H
1−α
n L
−η
n , (A.13)
where η = α+(1−α)(1−σ)+(1−σ)(1−σ) > 0 in order to guarantee a stable unique equilibrium. Solving for
population shares the last expression writes
λ−1n Φ
1
η
n
(
B
1

n
E[Vnn]
) 1
η
=
∑
k∈N
(
B
1

k
E[Vkk]
) 1
η
Φ
1
η
k , (A.14)
where Φn =
(
anyn
dnnwn
)α
pi
α/(1−σ)
nn H1−αn . Using equation (A.14) we can recover
B
1

n
E[Vnn]
given data for
{λn, yn, Hn} and using parameters {σ, α, }, estimates {dnn} and already recovered information on
{wn, an, pinn}. Again the theorems by Fujimoto and Krause (1985) apply to this type of equation
and proof uniqueness of the solution. In a next step we make use of subjective well-being data
as a measure for regions’ utility levels (see also Desmet et al. 2016). We resort to self-evaluation
of life satisfaction data provided by the OECD for European NUTS2 and NUTS1 regions. The
OECD indicators on regional life satisfaction are calculated using microdata from Gallup world
poll. Since our life satisfaction data bases on the so-called Cantril scale ranging from zero to ten,
we transform the data. Using individual income data jointly with the same source of information
on wellbeing Deaton and Stone (2013) find a robust correlation between subjective well-being
and log real income with a point estimate of ρ = 0.55.37 We apply their point estimate of a
linear-log specification and transform the subjective well-being data E[V˜n] such that we obtain
real income/indirect utility as it enters our model
E[Vnn] = e
1
ρE[V˜n]. (A.15)
37In particular, Deaton and Stone (2013) estimate a linear-log model with region fixed-effects
that absorb location-specific amenities.
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This measurement allows us to recover location amenities. Finally we plug in real income (16)
in (18) and solve for migration entry costs
m−n λ
−1
n φk =
∑
k∈N
m−k φk, (A.16)
where φn = Bn
(
anyn
dnnwn
)α (
pinn
Ln
)α/(1−σ) (
Hn
Ln
)(1−α)
. Given data for {Ln, yn, Hn}, estimates for
{dnn} and already recovered information on {wn, an, pinn, Bn} we can use equation (A.16) to recover
migration entry costs mn. The uniqueness proof follows from the theorems by Fujimoto and Krause
(1985). Note, that utility measures do not enter in the counterfactual simulation exercises. They
are used here only in order to separate migration costs from location amenities.
A.6 Summary statistics of exogenous and recovered vari-
ables
We present summary statistics of all our variables in Table A.2. Table A.3 shows that our recovered
variables do not exhibit obvious correlations and are sufficiently independent of each other.
B Counterfactual analysis
In the following we derive a system of equations that allows us to undertake a model based coun-
terfactual analysis of EU regional policy. Following Dekle et al. (2007) we denote a counterfac-
tual change as xˆ = x
′
x , where x is the observed variable and x
′ is the unobserved counterfac-
tual value of x. Given the model’s parameters {α, σ, , ιn, κy, κa, κd, β, θ, ξ} and the the variables
{λn, wn, pini, yn, τn, Tn} we use the following system of equations to solve for counterfactual changes
in the model’s endogenous variables {wˆn, yˆn, λˆn, pˆini, aˆn, dˆni} which determine changes in aggregate
welfare. Wage adjustments follow directly from equation (21):
wˆiwiλˆiλi = α
∑
k∈N
pˆikipikiyˆkykλˆkλk. (B.1)
Next, we divide the counterfactual by the equilibrium trade share using (10) and obtain
pˆini =
λˆi
(
dˆniwˆi
aˆi
)1−σ
∑
k∈N λˆk
(
dˆnkwˆk
aˆk
)1−σ
pink
. (B.2)
Similarly, we can express the change in counterfactual population by dividing the counterfactual
population mobility condition by the equilibrium mobility conditions (18) and (16)
λˆn =
(
Bˆn
mˆn
)(
pˆinn
λˆn
) α
1−σ
(
aˆnyˆn
dˆnnwˆn
)α (
1
λˆn
)(1−α)
∑
k∈N
(
Bˆk
mˆk
)(
pˆikk
λˆk
) α
1−σ
(
aˆkyˆk
dˆkkwˆk
)α (
1
λˆk
)(1−α)
λk
. (B.3)
Using equation (8) we can express per-capita income in the counterfactual equilibrium
yˆnyn =
1
α+ ιn − αιn
(
wˆnwn(1− τˆnτn) + κyTˆnTn + χˆχ
)
, (B.4)
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Table A.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
Own trade share (pinn) 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.89
Population (Ln) 840.70 717.91 18.11 6055.46
Wages per capita (wn) 38.48 17.58 2.44 146.04
Income per capita (yn) 51.48 22.13 5.74 198.50
Transfers per capita (Tn) 136.84 190.34 0.34 891.56
Transfers (TnLn) 84.19 129.72 0.25 808.98
Objective 1 regions 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Transfers in Obj. 1 regions 218.82 156.93 7.57 808.98
Transfers in non-Obj. 1 regions 25.66 46.71 0.25 422.04
Transfers per capita in Obj. 1 regions 366.55 184.54 55.00 891.56
Transfers per capita in non-Obj. 1 regions 36.97 65.35 0.34 630.22
Production amenity (an) 0.62 0.33 0.02 2.84
Own trade costs (dnn) 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Migration costs (mn) 214.62 220.47 1.08 1205.71
Location amenity (Bn) 3.18 9.37 0.00 80.64
Land supply (Hn) 828.46 599.13 7.53 3366.19
Share global portfolio (ιn) 0.32 0.34 0.00 1.00
Tax rates (tn) 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.25
Global portfolio return χ 3185.93 0.00 3185.93 3185.93
Note: Population is measured in thousand inhabitants, per-capita wages and per-capita income in thousand Euros, transfer levels
in million Euros, tax rates in percent, in migration costs in 103 units, and location amenity in 1016 units.
Table A.3: Correlation matrix of recovered variables
an Bn pinn mn
an 1 0.357 0.171 0.641
Bn 1 0.131 0.684
pinn 1 0.024
mn 1
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where returns from global portfolio change due to adjustments in income and population χˆχ =
(1−α)∑n ιnyˆnynλˆnλn. Tax rates are kept constant in our main analysis but we allow for changes
τˆnτn in robustness checks where we instead fix the total budget. The governments decision about
how to allocate the place-based policy budget feeds back on to the total tax revenue and thus on
to the budget for transfers TˆnTn. This is because the regional allocations of transfers impacts the
level of nominal wages which are proportional to the tax revenue. We run simulations for each
investment type separately and alternately set two out of the three transfer elasticities (κy, κa, κd)
to zero. Thus, local investments affect production amenities or travel time
a′n = γ
a
n + κ
a · ln(TˆnTnλˆnλnL¯)
(λˆnλnL¯)ξ
, (B.5)
and
TravelT ime′ri = γ
d
ri − κd ·
ln(TˆrTrλˆrλrL¯+ TˆiTiλˆiλiL¯)
(λˆrλrL¯+ λˆiλiL¯)ξ
, (B.6)
where the trade cost routine (Section A.1) converts travel time in trade costs. Tax revenue must
be equal to place-based policy expenditure such that government budget is balanced∑
n∈N
wˆnwnλˆnλnτˆnτn =
∑
n∈N
λˆnλnTˆnTn. (B.7)
Equations (B.1)-(B.7) enable us to solve for counterfactual changes in wages wˆn, trade shares
pˆin and population shares λˆn for all regions n. We obtain the change in aggregate welfare from
expected utility (20):
Ê[V ] =
(
1
pˆinn
) α
σ−1
(
1
wˆn
)α (
λˆn
) α
σ−1−(1−α)− 1
(
yˆnaˆn
dˆnn
)α
. (B.8)
The first, second and third terms capture general equilibrium effects via trade, migration and the
price index. The last term reflects direct effects (partial equilibrium) of transfers on local income,
production amenities, and intra-regional trade costs.
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B.1 Counterfactual analysis: No transfers
Figure B.1: Counterfactual analysis: No transfers scenario compared to observed
distribution of transfers
(a) Population (λˆn) (b) Wages (wˆn) (c) Own trade share (pˆinn)
(d) Regional income (yˆn) (e) Production amenities (aˆn) (f) Trade costs (dˆnn)
Note: Transfers act through wage subsidies and investments in production amenities and transport infrastructure. The
figure depicts changes in the particular variable reported by quantiles. A darker shading represents a stronger effect,
where a green (red) color illustrates a positive (negative) effect.
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B.2 Counterfactual analysis: Equal distribution of transfers
Figure B.2: Counterfactual analysis: Equal distribution of transfers compared to
observed scenario
(a) Population (λˆn) (b) Wages (wˆn) (c) Regional income (yˆn)
(d) Own trade share (pˆinn) (e) Production amenities (aˆn) (f) Trade costs (dˆnn)
Note: Transfers act through wage subsidies and investments in production amenities and transport infrastructure. The
figure depicts changes in the particular variable reported by quantiles. A darker shading represents a stronger effect,
where a green (red) color illustrates a positive (negative) effect.
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B.3 Counterfactual analysis: Explaining marginal welfare
effects
Figure B.3: Explaining marginal welfare effects of wage subsidies
(a) Migration entry costs (mn) (b) Location attractiveness (Bn)
(c) Resid. land supply (Hn) (d) Share to global portfolio (ιn)
Note: The scale change in utility is normalized and utility differences can be compared. Increases or decrease in utility are not
relevant in this figure.
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Figure B.4: Explaining marginal welfare effects of investments in production ameni-
ties
(a) Migration entry costs (mn) (b) Location attractiveness (Bn)
(c) Resid. land supply (Hn) (d) Share to global portfolio (ιn)
Note: The scale change in utility is normalized and utility differences can be compared. Increases or decrease in utility are not
relevant in this figure.
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Figure B.5: Explaining marginal welfare effects of investments in transport infras-
tructure
(a) Migration entry costs (mn) (b) Location attractiveness (Bn)
(c) Resid. land supply (Hn) (d) Share to global portfolio (ιn)
Note: The scale change in utility is normalized and utility differences can be compared. Increases or decrease in utility are not
relevant in this figure.
C Optimal Transfers
In this section we describe our numerical optimization routine with a government choosing the
welfare optimal transfer scheme. We use the Mathematical Programs With Equilibrium Constraints
(MPEC) approach described in Su and Judd (2012) for economic models and in particular applied
to trade models in Ossa (2014). Following their approach we maximize indirect utility of one
arbitrary region and take the model’s equilibrium conditions as constraints. Given this nonlinear
constrained optimization procedure the solution characterizes a spatial equilibrium as described in
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Section 3.7. Hence, our maximization problem writes
max
Tˆn,pˆinn,yˆn wˆn,λˆn
Ê[V ] =
(
1
pˆinn
) α
σ−1
(
yˆnaˆn
wˆndˆnn
)α (
λˆn
) α
σ−1−(1−α)− 1
(C.1)
s.t. all equilibrium conditions (B.1)-(B.7).
We either allow the government to make a lump sum wage subsidy or investments in production
amenities or investments in transport infrastructure or altogether. Accordingly, equations (B.4),
(B.5), and (B.6) apply in the optimization routine. For all our optimizations we hold tax rates
constant such that a shift in the transfer budget may only be generated by different distributions
of transfers.
C.1 Solving Approach
The step-by-step solution procedure for the problem stated above is as follows
1. From a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 109 we form a random initial
guess for transfer shares (Tn). We take absolute values to ensure the guess is positive and
normalize the guess such that the sum is equal to 1.
2. Based on random transfer share draws we compute the equilibrium values for changes in
wages (wˆn), population shares (λˆn), own trade shares (pˆinn), indirect utility of region 1 (Vˆ1)
and total transfers paid ( ˆ¯T ) satisfying equilibrium constraints (B.1)-(B.7). We take these
values as an initial guess for our optimization routine.
3. We maximize welfare subject to equilibrium constraints by numerically running an inte-
rior point algorithm in Artely’s Knitro solver. For any random initial guess our problem
converges to the same solution and this makes us confident that we have reached a global
optimum. In this global optimum migration cost adjusted utility is equalized, government
budget is balanced and all equilibrium conditions (as described in Section 3.7) are fulfilled
up to a small epsilon  < 1−10.
In the following we describe the optimization specification in more detail. The main challenge for
such an optimization is to make the numerical routine feasible for our 4 ·240 + 3 = 963 endogenous
variables with 3 · 240 + 4 = 724 equilibrium constraints and one objective function as described in
the previous section. First, in order to increase the convergence it is necessary to scale all variables
to a similar magnitude and bound these in the solver accordingly. Second, we supply gradients of
our objective function and equilibrium constraints and form a jacobian matrix. Both adjustments
result in a considerable speed gain and enable us to solve the optimization problem in appropriate
time (∼ 14 hours) on a high-end workstation. The matrix JB,λ shows the jacobian matrix of
constraint B with respect to variable variable λ.
JB,λ =

∂B1
∂λ1
. . . ∂Bn∂λ1 . . .
∂BN
∂λ1
...
...
...
...
...
∂B1
∂λn
. . . ∂Bn∂λn . . .
∂BN
∂λn
...
...
...
...
...
∂B1
∂λN
. . . ∂Bn∂λN . . .
∂BN
∂λN

. (C.2)
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